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CASE COMMENTS
CONSTTUTONAL LAw-FREDOM or SPECI- AND PBEss-DETra-
MINATION OF OBscENTy.-Action by the publisher of the unex-
purgated edition of Lady Chatterly's Lover to restrain the enforce-
ment of the Postmaster General's decision that the novel was
obscene and, as such, was nonmailable under the statute barring
obscene matters from the mails. 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (Supp. 1959).
Held, reversing the Postmaster Generals decision that the novel
was obscene, that the tests relating to obscenity are objective and
not subjective, and in determining what is obscene, the court con-
siders whether the dominant effect of the book is an appeal to
prurient interests, whether it exceeds the tolerance imposed by cur-
rent standards, and whether the references to sex are an integral
part of the overall theme sought to be conveyed to the reader.
Grove Press Inc. v. Christenberry, 175 F. Supp. 488, (S.D. New
York 1959).
The court in determining what is obscene and what is not is
faced with a difficult problem. It is torn between two duties, first,
the protection of free speech and press as prescribed by the first
amendment of the United States Constitution and secondly, the
demands of a society striving to prohibit traffic in obscene materials.
If it be too rigid in protecting the first, the door is opened for profit
in one of the most vile of enterprizes, while a too strict adherence
to the second principle would infringe upon one of the most funda-
mental of constitutional guarantees. The real difficulty is not
whether obscene material is under the protection of the first amend-
ment, but rather in determining what is obscene. For though the
phrasing of the amendment is unconditional, the court, when the
question was squarely presented, held that obscenity is not within
the area protected by the federal constitution. Roth v. United States
854 U.S. 476 (1957); Beauharnais v. Ill. 848 U.S. 250, (1952).
The earliest standard for judging obscenity was the so-called
Hicklin test, which judged the effect of isolated passages in the
work upon particularly susceptible persons. Regina v. Hicklin
3 Q.B. 360 (1868). This method brings to mind the oft-quoted state-
ment of Samuel Johnson to a lady who complained of the inclusion
of certain words in his dictionary: "Madam," Dr. Johnson said,
"you must have been looking for them." The absurdity of this view
was evident. Then in 1988 Judge Woolsey, in the famous case
involving James Joyce's novel Ulysses, repudiated the Hicklin test,
holding that the test to be applied is objective in that the work
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must be read as a whole and judged as to its effect upon a person
with average sex instincts. United States v. One Book Called Ulysses,
5 F. Supp. 182, (S.D. New York 1933).
The right to advocate ideas-any idea-has been jealously pro-
tected by the courts. The mere fact that the advocate holds views
contrary to general public sentiment is not sufficient for its supres-
sion. This concept has never been more forcefully stated than by
Justice Potter Stewart, speaking for the majority of the United States
Supreme Court, in holding unconstitutional a New York ban on the
showing of a movie based on Lady Chatterley's Lover. The picture
was banned on the grounds that it attractively portrayed adultery
in a manner which was contrary to the moral and religious views
of the time. Justice Stewart, in referring to the first amendment
said, "it protects advocacy of the opinion that adultery may some-
times be proper; no less than advocacy of socialism or the single
tax." Kingsley v. Regents, 79 S.Ct. 1362, (1959).
Roth v. U.S., supra, is probably a landmark decision in
the field of censorship. It represents a concrete attempt by
the Supreme Court to establish some standard by which obscenity
may be judged. The case stands for the proposition that material
is obscene if to an average person, applying contemporary standards,
the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to
prurient interests. This does not mean that whatever arouses lust-
ful thoughts and desires is obscene, for such a definition would be
much too broad for a society which today tolerates an erotic inter-
est in art and literature. A prurient interest is an unusual fascina-
tion with sex, an interest which goes almost to the point of perver-
sion. But even so, the general area for application of these tests
has of necessity remained quite broad. The Roth case made no
attempt to establish a specific set of circumstances to which these
rules could be applied. The court recognized that although the
material in that case could be classified as so-called "hard core"
pornography, the rules laid down could also be made apply to
works of art, science, and literature. Consequently in decisions
fter the Roth case the court, in reversing two lower court deci-
sions on the basis of these tests, limited its application solely to
the circumstances involved in each situation. A.L.I., MODEL PENAL
CODE § 207.10 (2) (Tenative Draft No. 6, 1957); One, Inc. v. Olesen,
355 U.S. 871, (1958), Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 855 U.S.
872, (1958).
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The instant case is the first time the Roth standards have been
applied to a major literary work. Lawrence's novel represents his
rebellion against the staid and proper victorian society in which he
lived. It has generally been considered by critics as one of the
better English novels, and is usually read by most serious students
in the field of literature. In writing it the author was faced with a
problem in linguistic expression. Unlike French or similar romance
languages, English has no socially acceptable word or words to
describe procreation. Use, by the author, of scientific terminology
would have been completely out of character for the persons in-
volved, so the author chose the words which would commonly be
used by the type person he sought to depict. It is these words which
aroused the furor concerning the book. This type situation is pre-
cisely what the court sought to provide for in the Roth decision.
It looked to the dominant theme of the novel and found the inclu-
sion of such words not "dirt for dirt's sake" but vital to the author's
expression and purpose.
There are many to who the novel is most distasteful, indeed
even shocking. To others it is the high point of D. H. Lawrence's
career and one of the bright spots in the field of English expres-
sion. Because the views are varied and subjective, it appears that
the court is correct in attempting to establish objective stand-
ards. By choosing a middle ground from which to attack each
individual situation as it occures and by discarding a hard and
narrow rule such as the Hicklin view for one with a broader and
more flexible base, the Supreme Court is now in the position to place
substantial restraint upon the smut industry, all the while protect-
ing the reading public from the over zealous censor.
J. G. V. M.
CoNsTrrUToNAL LAw-DuE PTocEss-WHAT CoNsTUTEs "Do-
nCG Busnmss.'--Three recent cases have considered the question of
what constitutes "doing business" within a state by a foreign corpor-
ation so as to subject such corporation to personal service and the
jurisdiction of state courts. In the first case, P, a Louisiana resident,
brought a libel action against D, a New York magazine publisher
and a foreign corporation with no offices or employees in Louisiana,
which merely had contacts with representatives in the state handling
subscriptions, sales, and circulation of D's magazines. D contended
that such activities did not amount to presence or "doing business"
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